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Reviewed by S.F.C. Milsomt
The reviewer determined to complain about something had better
pick on the title. The death in question, like Mark Twain's, may turn
out to have been exaggerated. Mr. Gilmore's book is as much about
the birth of contract as its death. And in a deeper sense it is not about
the death of anything, but about the way in which the common law
lives, perhaps the way in which any system of law lives.
To this improbable reviewer, a legal historian practicing mostly in
the Middle Ages, it has given that rare and unnerving pleasure experi-
enced by lecturers who suddenly, in full cry, understand what they
are saying. From time to time, pretending that he belongs in a law
school, the medievalist puts on a course with some such title as "me-
chanics of legal development." Part of it goes like this. The law is a
reiterated failure to classify life. There have always been categories
like tort and contract (the medieval words were trespass and covenant);
each cycle begins with fact situations being pinned up under the one
or the other without much need for thought. Under each heading, the
preoccupations of the formative period dictate more or less clear rules;
and the system as a whole acquires mathematical force. But as soon
as the force is compelling, the system is out of date. Both the classi-
fication itself and the rules within each category formed around yes-
terday's situations; when today's are pinned up on the same principles,
they are subjected to rules and yield results no longer appropriate. The
individual lawyer cannot hope to get the rules changed for his client,
but he can often try to have his case reclassified. No doubt a promise
is a promise: but it may also be or imply a statement, and if the rules
of contract do not effectively enforce the promise, the statement may
still trigger essentially tortious rules about reliance. This is how as-
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sumpsit began, not, of course, as the conscious device of a profession
suddenly aware that its rules of contract were out of date, but as a
back door to justice in a few hard cases. For the front door, the law
of contract governing at the time, you needed a document under seal;
this once sensible requirement of proof for large transactions was be-
ing forced upon small ones by economic and jurisdictional changes,
hitting first and worst those who themselves acted on their agreements
but had no document with which to attack the other side. It was for
such victims that lawyers first sought out a backdoor "tort theory." But
the inappropriateness of sealing wax for daily business turned it into
the main entrance: most agreements were made on the footing that
any litigation would be in assumpsit, and the document under seal
came to be used only for special transactions. And so our first law of
contract died its death, and there was conceived that which was to
flourish in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and to die so oppor-
tunely under the eyes of Mr. Gilmore.
The medievalist's offering is of course a little fraudulent: already
uncomfortable as the 17th century looms up, he never reaches the 19th,
let alone today; names like 'promissory estoppel' and 'products lia-
bility' have hitherto been dropped to suggest that it all belongs to-
gether and that the past can illuminate the present.' Now it turns
out that it all does indeed belong together, and that the present can
also illuminate the past. One might say that Mr. Gilmore has almost
produced this play again in modem dress, but with the richness of
ascertainable detail, the immediacy of Corbin's recollections, and the
solidity of Mr. Fuller's reliance cases2 instead of those shadowy early
assumpsits. But one difference deserves discussion. The mechanism
depends upon there being clearly separate categories within which
rules are insulated, and the early assumpsit cases seem to have been
truly seen or at least truly presented as trespass rather than covenant,
in our language tort rather than contract. It was this that warded off
the requirement of a seal, and development would have been crippled
by a suggestion which left some traces in the year books: that even in
the tort action a plaintiff relied upon the contract as a factual in-
gredient, must prove it appropriately. 3 The modern analogue, pre-
sumably, would be a holding that reliance entitled you to reliance
damages, but did not absolve you from the need to prove consideration.
1. On all the foregoing, see the present reviewer's HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW (1969) and Reason in the Development of the Common Law, 81 LAW Q.
REv. 496 (1965).
2. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373
(1936).
3. Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 4, f. 3d, pl. 9; Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen. 4, f. 33, pl. 60.
1586
Vol. 84: 1585, 1975
A Pageant in Modern Dress
But the development described by Mr. Gilmore began entirely in
contract, the separate categories being epitomized by two sections of
the first Restatement of Contracts, § 75 (consideration) and § 90 (re-
liance). His account of their genesis is perhaps the most absorbing
passage in this absorbing book. He also gives as good an explanation
as we can hope for of the paradoxical fact of the two sections in
the same document: the text and illustrations of § 90 suggest "that
no one had any idea what the damn thing meant"; 4 it was com-
pelled by a line of cases won by plaintiffs who could plainly show no
consideration within the meaning of § 75, in many of which the courts
had resorted to talk of estoppel, "which is simply a way of saying that,
for reasons which the court does not care to discuss, there must be
judgment for plaintiff."' Section 90, in short, represents a sensible,
practical view taken in hard cases. "A sensible, practical view it may
be," wrote the greatest of legal historians about a very different devel-
opment, "but legal principle avenges itself.'"' Mr. Gilmore mentions
recent suggestions that a recovery based on the principle behind § 90
is not a contract recovery at all.7 As a practical matter, of course, such
recovery accommodates plaintiffs who lack some component in the
contract package other than consideration; it would also lead to greater
flexibility over damages (a need, incidentally, which seems to have
helped the beginning of assumpsit). But the compulsion to intellec-
tualize is surely playing its part. Of §§ 75 and 90 Mr. Gilmore says
that "these two contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably to-
gether: in the end one must swallow the other up."s Or push it out
into a different compartment of the law? The animals can live at the
same time provided they are in separate cages.
And it remains astonishing that they have for quite a long period
lived together as incompatible principles in the same compartment;
and here a geographical rather than a historical comparison may be
helpful. This vigorous coexistence has not happened in England, and
could not have happened. The English promissory estoppel is an ane-
mic creature able only to release obligations; it cannot replace con-
sideration in creating liability. Mr. Gilmore charitably attributes this
difference to a more relaxed English view of consideration, 9 but the
4. G. GILNOrE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 65 (1974) [hereinafter cited to page number
only].
5. P. 64.
6. 1 F. MAITLAND, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 447 (1911).
7. Pp. 66, 72.
8. P. 61.
9. P. 100; see also p. 129 n.145.
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offended reaction when the pale English estoppel was introduced, less
than 30 years ago, 10 suggests that here he is overgenerous. The likely
explanation, and one which gives the story a new juridical twist, is
that the English have been hidebound enough never to do anything
about sealing wax. It remained possible to embody an agreement in a
document under seal, and so long as the forms of action mattered the
chief result was that litigation would be in one of the old actions
rather than in assumpsit. The chief result today is that one can make
a promise binding without any consideration. The kind of case in
which American courts first resorted to promissory estoppel, for ex-
ample, the promised benefaction, would therefore look less hard in Eng-
land: the benefactor could have made a binding promise under seal,
and the beneficiary relied on anything less at his own risk.
But what actually happened or not is less important than what could
have happened, and however pressing the need, things could not have
happened in England quite as they did in the United States. There
could not have been a Restatement enunciating contradictory prin-
ciples because there could not have been a Restatement at all. It is
a larger proposition than it sounds. There is no room for a Restatement
in a single jurisdiction with a clear hierarchy of courts and the rigid
adherence to a monolithic precedent that is its product. There is no
room either for that vitalizing competition between ideas and ap-
proaches so strikingly exemplified by the American story. Multiplicity
of jurisdictions does not alter the basic mechanism of change, but it
enables it to respond much faster.
The English experience may be relevant to another aspect of Mr.
Gilmore's story, namely the 19th-century appearance of contract as a
system, a subject in itself. He attributes to Langdell's casebook, first
published in 1871, and in particular to a summary appended to the
second edition in 1880, "the idea that there was-or should be-such a
thing as a general theory of contract,"" and to Holmes and then Willis-
ton the enunciation and elaboration of that theory; Holmes's formula-
tion in particular is beautifully expounded. But these system-builders
may have found more spadework done than is here suggested, and more
by way of foundations already laid. Mr. Gilmore' 2 remarks that many
of Langdell's cases were English, and that the jurisdictional unity in
England makes for doctrinal coherence. "English case law is manage-
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able in a way that American case law has never been."1 3 Another adjec-
tive would be "stifling." But it is certainly manageable for the writers
of textbooks, and a cursory glance suggests that they may by the date
of Langdell's book and summary have come closer than their American
counterparts to formulating a theory of contract, or at any rate to
assuming that there was such a thing. Where did the idea come from?
It may not be irrelevant that among the earliest treatises on contract
to be published in English were translations of Pothier.14 But we
would be as wrong to think of a civilian idea being casually taken up,
as Mr. Gilmore may be wrong in seeing a like idea as coming out of
the blue to Langdell. History had left a vacuum to be filled and law-
yers' thinking necessarily requires the kind of classification with which
this review began.
The Middle Ages had a concept like our contract, or rather had two
concepts. Their "covenant" was about the enforcement of agreements
as such. And their "contract," confusingly different from ours, was
something like the Roman contract re: it was about the duties arising
when certain transactions were executed on one side, most obviously
loans. But these concepts were submerged by assumpsit, which ex-
pressed the matter in tort: even in the early 19th century, for example,
the contractual defendant would be charged with deceit, though so
formally that he did not even take offense. This made the old con-
cepts unusable. Trespass and covenant became the names of actions
and for a century or so legal thought proceeded in terms not of separate
abstract categories but of separate "forms of action." The assumption
that such thought is as old as the common law writs has done much
to make our legal history seem unsatisfying; indeed the thought it-
self must have been unsatisfying too. The rise of our own ideas can
be traced in the titles of books. 'Tort' was a newcomer in such a role,
and at first needed a subtitle explaining torts as wrongs.'3 But 'con-
tract' had only to be expanded from its old sense. Powell in 1790 on
the Law of Contracts and Agreements was followed in 1807 by Comyn
13. P. 55.
14. The earliest translation of R.J. Pothier's Treatise on Obligations was American,
but was presumably done not just to satisfy juridical curiosity: It was published in 1802
by F.X. Martin, who also wrote on the laws of North Carolina and of Louisiana. Another
translation was published in London in 1806 by W.D. Evans, who admired the cosmo-
politan learning of Lord Mansfield and saw the value of comparative study; this edition
was reproduced 20 years later in Philadelphia.
15. The lateness of books on torts is interesting. The earliest was American. F.
HILLIARD, LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS (1859). In England, instructive titles are C.G.
ADDISON, WRONGS AND THEIR RE.tEDIES, BEING THE LAW OF TORTS (1860) (15 years after his
contract book); A. UNDERHILL, LAW OF TORTS, OR WRONGS INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT (1873).
Even F. POLLOCK, LAiW OF TORTS (1887) has a subtitle referring to 'Civil Wrongs.'
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on Law of Contracts and Agreements not under Seal, and the additions
were evidently needed to bring in the original idea of 'covenant.' But
for Chitty in 1826, Addison in 1845, Smith in 1847 and Leake in
1867, Law of Contracts by itself was enough to mark out the field.
Pollock in 1876 and Anson in 1879 both expressly endowed it with
"principles." Pollock, in fact, took a further step relevant to Mr. Gil-
more's theme: he went into the singular with Principles of Contract.1
Pollock must bring us back to his great friend Holmes, and to
another dimension of a book which could take on a team of reviewers
and entice each into a different sort of irrelevance. This notice has
sought to place Mr. Gilmore's insights about contract in the context
of centuries. To others, the main interest will not be in contract at
all, but in his picture of the American legal scene in the last hundred
years. It comes almost in throwaway sketches: Williston and Corbin;
the making of the Restatements; Holmes's dramatic lectures on the
common law. A line here and a line there, and that is what people
were like and how things happened. The life of the law may be all
sorts of solemn things, but in court and classroom it can also be seen
as something which hardly ever comes through in print: sheer pleasure
in predicaments and solutions, in the economy of ideas. It is this
which makes Mr. Gilmore's so perceptive as well as so enjoyable a book.
16. A subtitle notes that references are made to American law, as well as to Roman
and European law and to the Indian Contract Act of 1872.
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